The ‘Reserve’ Dollar: An Austrian Approach
The dollar first became the “reserve currency” of the world
at the end of WWII. We, the US, still held a gold standard, and the dollar was
regarded as “good as gold” for trading purposes among trading nations via the
Bretton Woods Agreement. But though a few decades later, in September 1971, we
abandoned the gold standard, the dollar still retained its position
internationally primarily because of the relative strength of the US economy
(1). That is beginning to change today, in main, due to the inflation of the
dollar and the closing gap between the US economy and other economies
internationally, but the US is still in a position to take advantage of the
position of the dollar to continue enormous government deficit spending, and
has done so consistently since abandoning the gold standard (3). Is this
situation a problem for the US economy?
Some are beginning to answer yes. Surprisingly, many of the
critics of this state of affairs come from the Keynesian persuasion. They look
to the weakness of job growth, the rather large government budget and deficit
spending, trade deficits, and financial bubbles as consequences of our
dedication to the status quo regarding the reserve dollar. Several of these
critics call for a return to the gold standard, which one proponent calls “the
least imperfect monetary system of history” (3). On the other side of the
argument, lie those that think that a return to the gold standard and thus a
fixed exchange rate, would lead to further imbalances between trading nations
internationally and cite the troubles of smaller nations within the euro zone
as a modern example of these troubles with the exchange rate and recovery from
the boom and bust cycle (4). And a third perspective is that yes, the dollar is
declining in prominence as the reserve currency of choice, particularly in
China and Europe, but this cycle of reserve currencies is nothing new, as it is
the currency of the dominant economic force that fills this role, a position
that has continuously shifted throughout history, and only since the twentieth
century rests with the US (5).
The discussion at the root of this debate is money,
particularly as it relates to our current fiat money vs. the classical gold standard.
Austrian thought would certainly hold that our current monetary situation is
far from ideal. And the gold standard is certainly moving in the right
direction, one of diminished government intervention in the money supply, and the
allowance of the variability of this money supply due to changes in the supply
and demand of it and purely independent of intervention. Mises, in his The Theory of Money and Credit, clearly
expands on the inevitable problems that arise alongside intervention; namely
the impossibility in determining both the need for, and the proper amount and
application of this intervention where the exchange-value of money is
concerned. And the ability of a
metallic, perhaps gold, system to remain more easily outside government force
is one of its primary strengths from an Austrian perspective (2).
This strength is perhaps one of the reasons that is was abandoned. The government has an agenda outside of monetary security, and the ability to influence so thoroughly the money supply is invaluable in pursuing these goals (2). So, until the concerns with our current situation are vocal enough and widespread enough to outweigh the comfort and naively implicit trust in our government, we should not expect to see any changes in it. Particularly ones that would challenge and diminish the control and power of our government institutions, and power that the 'reserve' dollar cannot help but perpetuate.
3. Lehrman, Lewis
E. & Mueller, John D. “How the ‘Reserve’ Dollar Harms America.” Opinion. The Wall Street Journal 21 November
2014: A13. Print.
4. Miles,
William. “Gold Standard Wont Solve ‘Reserve’ Dollar Problem.” Opinion. The Wall Street Journal 25 November
2014: A12. Print.